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HOROWITZ v. HOROWITZ
by the same rules. A corporation which promises to
pay a certain sum as benefits during a member's ill-
ness, in consideration of his payment of dues, is not
purely a benevolent organization; it may be, and
doubtless is, benevolent and charitable in a great de-
gree, but it is not a benevolent organization in the
sense of dispensing benefits without consideration. ' '1 2
In 1859, when Anacosta Tribe v. Murbach, was tried
and decided, there were comparatively few such organiza-
tions of any power or wealth. The small handful of mu-
tual benefit societies gathered momentum; ever increasing
in size and number they now encompass varied but im-
pressive financial interests. Confronting this unexpected
mass are the decisions of those judges who puffed an idea,
conceived under entirely different circumstances and dif-
ferent conditions, beyond the confines of the original opin-
ions rendered in cases analogous, yet requisite of distinc-
tion. To protect that unsuspecting and unwary group of
"joiners", whose numbers are constantly being enlarged, it
is imperative that constructive and clarifying legislation'
be enacted to prevent the usurpation by voluntary agencies
of courts of law from their rightful position as arbiters in
disputes involving property rights.
THE DOCTRINE OF RES ADJUDICATA
Horowitz v. Horowitz'
This case involved a question as to the application of the
doctrine of res adjudicata under the following circum-
stances.
The widow and infant children of a decedent filed a bill
in which they asserted that an assignment of certain cor-
porate stock, made by the decedent to his father, defendant
to the bill, was made in trust for plaintiffs. They asked to
have a trust impressed on the stock, and the defendant's
answer asserted in defense that the assignment effected a
free and voluntary gift of the stock to him, free of any
trust. The court thereafter passed a decree dismissing the
go The ruling in the Bauer case was approved and followed In Supreme
Council, 0. C. F. v. Garrigus, 104 Ind. 133, 54 Am. Rep. 298 (1885)
Danlher v. Grand Lodge, A. 0. U. W., 10 Utah 110, 37 Pac. 245 (1894);
McMahon v. Supreme Tent K. M., 151 Mo. 522, 52 S. W. 384 (1899); Za-
remba v. International Harvester Corp., 162 Wis. 231, 155 N. W. 114
(1915) ; Sweet v. Modern Woodmen, 169 Wis. 462, 172 N. W. 143 (1919).
1175 Md. 16, 199 A. 816 (1938).
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bill, with a qualification to the effect that nothing in the
decree should "prejudice or affect the right of the estate of
the said deceased, or the administratrix and distributees of
the said estate, to proceed as they may be advised is proper
to enforce any rights of said estate and the distributees
thereof in, to and respecting said stock." Subsequently
the widow as administratrix filed a bill against the same
defendant, asking that she, as administratrix, be declared
the true owner of the stock, and the Chancellor so decided,
holding that the title to the stock was vested in the estate
of the deceased, for the reason that the defendant had, in
the previous case, "affirmatively asserted in his answer
title in himself" to said stock, "by virtue of an alleged gift"
to him by deceased, "thus making said gift and title in the
defendant an issue in said cause", which issue "was adjudi-
cated by the court adversely to him". On the defendant's
appeal from this latter decree, the Court of Appeals re-
versed it, giving as the reason, and the sole reason, for such
reversal, the presence of the words of qualification in the
decree dismissing the bill in the previous suit, the opinion
stating that, had it not been for these words of qualifica-
tion, the decree of dismissal would have been an adjudica-
tion of the merits of the controversy, constituting "a bar to
any further litigation of the same subject between the same
parties". The opinion thus said, in effect, that were it not
for the words of qualification in the decree dismissing the
bill in the first suit, defendant would have been precluded
by such decree from asserting in the second suit the de-
fense which it did assert therein, that deceased had made a
valid transfer to him of the stock, vesting in him the title
thereto. The implication of the opinion is almost unavoid-
able that such preclusion would have existed, as the Chan-
cellor stated that it did, by reason of the fact that the de-
fendant had asserted such defense in the previous suit,
which had been adjudicated.
As regards the effect of the words of qualification in the
decree dismissing the earlier bill, it may be questioned
whether these words, obviously intended for the benefit
of decedent's estate and the distributees thereof, as en-
abling them to bring a subsequent suit to assert their
rights, should, as was done by the Court of Appeals, be
given an effect favorable to the defendant, for whose bene-
fit the words were apparently not intended, as enabling
him to make a defense which otherwise he could not have
made.
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But conceding the correctness of the opinion in giving
such effect to the qualifying words, for the purpose of the
actual decision, there seems room for question as to the
view, apparently asserted in the opinion, that the dismissal
of the bill in the earlier case, without words of qualifica-
tion, would have involved an adjudication adverse to the
defendant's title to the stock, precluding him from assert-
ing such title in the subsequent suit by the administratrix.
Any discussion of this question involves a consideration of
the nature of the issue or issues adjudicated in the prior
suit, since an adjudication can be regarded as res adjudi-
cata, for the purpose of an issue in a subsequent suit on a
different claim or demand, only in so far as that issue was
involved in the prior suit.2
The issue raised by the bill in the first suit was as to
the existence of a trust, and it is difficult to concede that a
different issue was introduced because defendant's answer
denied "that said stock was delivered to him in trust as al-
leged", and asserted that, "on the contrary", it "was given
to him as his absolute property". This language of the
answer seems to amount merely to a denial that the gift to
defendant was in trust, as asserted in the bill. As said in
the appellant's brief, "wherein does a mere admission of
plaintiffs' allegation that the stock was given him, with a
denial that it was given in trust for plaintiffs, differ from
an assertion that it was not given in trust for them?" But
even conceding that defendant's answer in the first suit did,
as asserted by the Chancellor in the second suit, make the
gift to and title in defendant an issue in the first suit, it is
difficult to see how the decree, which merely dismissed the
bill asserting a trust, could be regarded as an adjudication
adverse to defendant as regards the gift to him and his
title to the stock. The decree contained no reference to
the question of title to the stock. The Chancellor did, it is
true, in passing the decree of dismissal, state that, in his
opinion, decedent made no valid gift of the stock to defend-
ant, and that the title to and- ownership of the stock re-
mained in decedent's estate, but this expression of opinion
was not part of the decree, and could not limit or extend its
effect. As explicitly stated in the opinion of the Court of
Appeals, in accordance with the Maryland cases, the rea-
sons given for a decree are not a part thereof, and this
2 Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Gimbel, 171 Md. 1, 187 A. 856 (1936) ; Kiser v.
Lucas, 170 Md. 486, 185 A. 441 (1936) ; FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th Ed.) Secs.
272, 277; 34 C. J. 915, 937. Judgments, Secs. 1325, 1340.
19401
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
is certainly true of expressions of opinion which cannot
even be regarded as reasons for the decree.3 It would
seem to have been owing to a misapprehension by the
Chancellor in the second case as to the effect of the ex-
pression of opinion in the earlier case, that the decision in
the earlier case was regarded by him as conclusive of the
later case. Ignoring this expression of opinion as, it seems,
it should be ignored, it appears that the decree of dismissal,
even if it could be regarded as an adjudication as to de-
fendant's title to the stock, might as well be construed as
adjudging the title to be in the defendant as to be in dece-
dent's estate.
Another consideration adverse to the view that the de-
cree dismissing the bill, if without qualification, would
have been available to the administratrix in the second
suit, as establishing her title to the stock, is the fact that the
administratrix was not, as such, a party to the first suit.
An adjudication in favor of one who is not a party to the
suit in which the adjudication occurs, is a somewhat dif-
ficult conception. Ordinarily a judgment or decree is avail-
able in a second suit only to one who was a party to the
first suit, or to one in privity with a party,4 this being
merely an application of the general rule that a judgment
is conclusive only as between the parties to the suit and
their privies.5 While exceptions exist to the rule restrict-
mg the benefit of a previous judgment or decree to a party,
or the privy of a party, to the previous suit,8 these excep-
tions appear to be based upon the theory, in the particular
case, of an identity of interest or liability between parties
to the two suits. And it can hardly be said that, in the
Horowitz case, there was identity of liability or interest
between the administratrix, plaintiff in the second suit,
seeking to recover the stock as belonging to decedent's
estate, and plaintiffs in the first suit, asserting a trust as
created by decedent in his lifetime. Nor was there any
privity between them, privity existing, in this connection,
3 That an opinion is not part of the decree, see Martin v. Evans, 85 Md.
8, 36 A. 258 (1897) ; Alleghany Corp. v. Aldebaran Corp., 173 Md. 472, 196
A. 418 (1938).
434 C. J. 973, Judgments, Sec. 13g(1) ; Towing Co. v. Assurance Co., 99
Md. 433, 58 A. 16 (1904) ; Groshon v. Thomas, 20 Md. 234 (1863) ; Mosch-
zisker, Re8 Judicata (1929) 38 Yale L. J. 299, 303.
5 Feldmeyer v. Werntz, 119 Md. 285, 86 A. 986 (1913) ; Wiley v. McComas,
137 Md. 637, 113 A. 98 (1921) ; 2 BLACK, JUDGMENTS (2nd Ed.) Sec. 534.
6 34 C. J. 975-84, Judgments, Secs. 1392-1404. See Myers v. Gordon, 165
Md. 534, 170 A. 186 (1934).
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only by reason of mutual or successive relation to the same
right of property.7
The doctrine of res adjudicata (or res judicata) em-
braces two main rules, the distinction between which is
frequently ignored by the courts." One rule is that a
former adjudication, rendered on the merits, is an absolute
bar to a subsequent suit between the same parties or their
privies upon the same claim or demand,9 and the other rule
is that an adjudication of any issue, fact, or matter is con-
clusive as between the parties and their privies for the pur-
pose of a subsequent action or suit, although this be upon a
different claim or demand.10 The language of the opinion
in Horowitz v. Horowitz seems to suggest an anomalous
extension of the latter rule, to the effect that the defendant
to a bill in equity, though securing an unqualified decree
dismissing the bill, is precluded from asserting, in a subse-
quent suit by the same plaintiff, any defense which he
may have asserted in the first suit.
IMPEACHMENT BY A PARTY OF HIS OWN WITNESS
Chenoweth v. Baltimore Contracting Company'
The Defendant-appellee contracting company operated
a railroad yard in which coal cars were emptied, shifted
and transferred. Decedent, an employee of the Defendant
company, was found dead in this yard. The surviving widow
and child brought this action on the ground that his death
was caused by the negligence of Defendant. Plaintiffs
called as their witnesses certain employees of the Defendant
company and attempted to interrogate these witnesses as
to other prior statements allegedly inconsistent with their
statements at the trial. The lower court refused to permit
the attempted interrogation and impeachment and Plain-
tiffs appealed from the ruling, after a verdict and judg-
ment for the Defendants.
715 R. C. L., Judgments, Sec. 488; 1 FREEMAN, op. cit. supra n. 2, Sec. 438.8 As to the distinction between the two rules, see 2 BLAcK, op. cit. supra
n. 5, Sees. 506, 673; 2 FIBMMAN, op. cit. supra n. 2, Sees. 676, 677; 34 C. J.
743, 874, Judgments, Sees. 1154, 1283; Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S.
351, 24 L. Ed. 195 (1877).
As In State v. Brown, 64 Md. 199, 1 A. 54 (1885) ; Impervious Products
Co. v. Gray, 127 Md. 64, 96 A. 1 (1915) : Moodhe v. Schenker, 176 Md. 259,
4 A. (2d) 453 (1939).1 As in Trayhern v. Colburn, 66 Md. 277, 7 A. 459 (1886); Barrick v.
Horner, 78 Md. 243, 27 A. 1111 (1893) ; Miller v. Miller, 159 Md. 204, 150
A. 451 (1930).
1 6 A. (2d) 625 (Md. 1939).
